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I t is Appellants' position that if in fact Mrs. Ander-
son did retain certain benefits and uses under the trust, 
a creditor of Mrs. Anderson has no more rights and can 
secure no greater benefits under the trust than Mrs. 
Anderson could herself. This position is supported by 
the R E S T A T E M E N T O F T R U S T S , 2d §114 and 
is consistent with the statute in question, UCA 25-1-11. 
The statute relied on by Respondent declares that "all 
deeds, gifts . . . made in trust for the use of the person 
making the same shall be void as against the existing 
or subsequent creditors of such person." The R E -
S T A T E M E N T , in discussing statutes of this type, 
states: 
§114 The Settlor as Beneficiary 
The Settlor of a trust may be one of the bene-
ficiaries or the sole beneficiary of the trust. 
* * * 
Illustrations 
1. Statutes. In some states there are 
statutes which provide that a transfer in trust 
for the benefit of the settlor is void. Such 
statutes are interpreted as sole benefit of the 
settlor. 
(emphasis added) 
The respondent merely assumes that because Mrs. 
Anderson does receive certain benefits under the trust, 
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a 
the entire trust is therefore one for her sole benefit and 
that it falls within the meaning and intent of UCA 
25-1-11 — an obvious non sequitur. I,. V.-Ini II »>f tiu 
Respondent's Brief, certain uses and benefits oi liu 
trustor are listed and from this list Respondent con-
cludes that Mrs. Anderson is the sole beneficiary of the 
trust. Respondent ignores the other provisions of her 
trust dealing with the distribution of her estate to her 
children and grandchildren upon her ik-ath [R87-98]. 
In addition, the testimony of Mrs Anderson corrobor-
ated by Mr. Guyman, the trust officer, as to Mrs. 
Anderson's reasons for setting up the trust is ignored. 
They testified that Mrs. Anderson wanted the trust to 
protect and preserve her estate to equalize the distribu-
tion of her estate upon her death. She was also interested 
in protecting her estate from the constant demands of 
her son [R-158, 174-5]. From the above testimony and 
the trust agreement itself, it can be seen that the trust 
in fact was not for the sole benefit of the trustor. - ^ 
provided benefits for Mrs, Anderson's children and 
grandchildren. 
POIN'I 
R E S P O N D E N T F A I L S TO AD-
D R E S S T H E P O I N T T H A T T H E 
J U D G M E N T MUST B E R E V E R S E D 
B E C A U S E I 1 A F F E C T S A S S E T S 
T H A T COULD NOT P O S S I B L Y B E 
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W I T H I N T H E S T A T U T E R E L I E D 
U P O N . 
The statute relied upon, UCA 25-1-11, by its terms 
applies only to personal property, yet the judgment 
appealed from grants Plaintiff's judgment "in the 
amount of $14,680.67 together with interest thereon,'' 
without any limitations as to the assets affected. The 
record clearly indicates that this trust is composed 
mainly of real property. Respondents ignore this dilem-
ma and refer instead to the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. We submit that their treatment of this 
issue is a confession that on this point, at least, the judg-
ment is unduly broad and must be reversed. 
P O I N T I I I 
RESPONDENT EVIDENTIALLY 
CONCEDES THAT EVEN IF THIS 
TRUST WERE FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF THE TRUSTOR, A SUBSEQUENT 
CREDITOR COULD REACH ONLY 
THE INTEREST OF THE TRUSTOR. 
The statute is designed to declare a creditor's rights 
and to do no more than that. In that respect it is also 
clear that the judgment appealed from goes far beyond 
even the authorities relied upon by Leach since the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
judgment appealed from would permit Leach to reach 
all of the trust assets, immediately. In that regard, even 
assuming that the trust is for the sole benefit of Appel-
lant, it clearly provides that she is to be maintained in 
the standard of living enjoyed by her at the time the 
trust was created. Thus Leach should be permitted to 
execute on no more than that portion of the trust assets 
which Norma Anderson herself could demand. To that 
extent, the judgment appealed from must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's arguments in the first full paragraph 
on page nine of his brief that the purpose of the trust 
was to guarantee Norma Anderson a generous salary 
from the family corporations is a misstatement, but more 
importantly it illustrates that this trust could not be 
considered within the policy of the statute. If Respon-
dent is correct he should also be able to satisfy his judg-
ment from the "generous salary" being paid to Norma 
Anderson. Obviously that is not so or this case would 
never have been initiated. The statute, even if it applies, 
gives Respondent rights only with respect to Norma 
Anderson's interest. So considered, this appeal repre-
sents an attempt to apply the statute for purposes never 
intended. 
For all of these reasons, the judgment should be 
reversed. 
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